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AlUjilJIVmiNT 
I. INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM 
UDOT does not appear to seriously dispute thai Appellant indeed sui icred ^ v < >  .omic 
harm liom IT)OT. reeonstruetior ~fT 1 * -ppdic*. * ;;. .. . u '• -- * •> 
avoid paying lui ..,./ .,.?'.,;, • . . - * \ ppcllanfb right to 
. . • " * . i .-• • h e > \ppelloiii io „ul entitled to a jury trial. Each of 
these contentions will be addressed in turn. 
farm Caused by Inverse ( oiidemnatioii 
Nevertheless Compensable 
• >* t: • nan for or pay for all losses caused by public 
: 'xppellce'b Brief, pp.(>-,". Justice holmes' response to that contention is a- ,]*,; 
today as when he uttered it in 1922 in the seminal case on inverse eomliitiifiatiOii: 
We are in danger oi lorgeumg u. .-. pm/i.. ACbiic io j.nprove the public 
condition is not enough to wan dm ». .;ie\ ing the desire by a shorter cut than 
the consfi'ntion-il way of nnvimr for the change. 
PennsyK ania Coal v. Mahon, 3oU U.s w .416, ^ s r \ 1 58. Gn L .M 322 i .v . , ms 
court has acknowledged that principle is applk am .,..;., we. . UJV^LI f it'ipoicu.w„ .. 
Salt Lake Lit\ . 'x* . ; '; n g Justice 1 lolmesj. 
• »*• ' - •-mpensation Clause \\ ere well aware that unintentionally-
caused harm is compensable. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 
(I 8^8)f'Damage i\s n-. * ahvavs-'-ir fi~* 1'n not often a _ 
unit uikid lor as me conseqiu .< . t f >rms.")(Samuel R. Thuiman), 
Opening bricl < • . ^ • ?< >• *. Iiibit 4. And Utah law is clear that "Intent is not an element of 
1 
[an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 
803 P.2d 1241,1246 (Utah 1990)(interpreting UTAH CONST, art. I, §22). 
If a jury determines UDOT caused Appellant's economic harm, the state cannot avoid 
paying for it on the ground that the state did not plan to do so. 
B. Appellant Can Recover Even Though its Right to Use its Land Was Not Totally 
Destroyed 
UDOT misinterprets this court's decision in Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County. 
2004 UT App 135, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 as standing for the proposition that a taking 
occurs only when governmental conduct renders private land "economically idle." Appellee's 
Brief, p. 14. On the contrary, this court emphasized in Diamond B-Y Ranches that a taking 
occurs when there is: 
[denial of] all economically beneficial or productive use of land, or, even if the 
property has not necessarily been deprived of all economically beneficial use, an 
analysis of several factors indicates that the interference is so great that a virtual 
taking has nonetheless occurred. 
Id. 2004 UT App at [^14, quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 
S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001)(emphasis added). 
This court recognized in Diamond B-Y Ranches, as did the United States Supreme 
Court in Palazzolo, that partial takings are compensable. Therefore, a taking can be found 
if either Appellant's right to use its land has been completely destroyed or if "an analysis of 
several factors indicates that the interference is so great that a virtual taking [of Appellant's 
right to use its land] has nonetheless occurred." Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 
2 
2004 UT App at |14. Whether a partial taking has occurred depends on application of the 
Penn Central factors: "The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations . . . [and] the character of the governmental action." Diamond B-Y Ranches v. 
Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135, f 14, quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This is the functional equivalent of the test for a 
compensable "taking" developed by the Utah Supreme Court under Utah's Just Compensation 
Clause. UTAH CONST, art. I, §22; Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622,626 (Utah 
1990)(A "taking" is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed.") 
Appellant therefore can recover if it has suffered a partial taking of Appellant's right 
to use its land. 
C. Appellant is Entitled to a Jury Trial 
UDOT contends that Appellant is not entitled to a jury trial. Appellee's Brief, p. 15. 
On the contrary, whether a taking has occurred in this case is a question of fact, and 
Appellant is entitled to have a jury decide that question. 
First, the application of the Penn Central factors to determine whether Appellant's 
right to use its land was substantially impaired is a question of fact. In considering whether 
an exaction in the land development setting constituted a taking, this court described 
application of the Penn Central factors as a "fact-intensive inquiry." B.A.M. Development 
3 
L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, ^ [109 87 P.3d 710. And in the analogous federal 
setting, the United States Supreme Court has held that whether a landowner has been 
deprived of economically viable use is a "predominantly factual question.11 City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. Ltd.. 526 U.S. 687, 720, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1644 
(1999)(construing federal Just Compensation Clause, U.S. CONST, amend. V). 
Second, Appellant is entitled to have a jury decide the factual question of whether 
Appellant has suffered a taking. The drafters of the Utah Constitution fully intended that a 
jury would determine whether the state has committed a compensable taking. See 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention ill (1898)(ff...the means of 
arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before a 
jury.f,)(Lorin Fair), Opening Brief, Addendum Exhibit 4. See also UTAH CONST. Art. 1, § 10 
(Trial by Jury); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 
1981)(Utah Const. Art. I, §10 guarantees right to jury trial on legal issues in civil caseg); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-21-1 ("In actions for the recovery of specific reed or personal property, 
with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for 
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial 
is waived or a reference is ordered."); Richards v. Salt Lake City, 49 Utah 28, 161 P. 680 
(1916)(whether road debris on private lot warrants compensation is a question for the jury). 
Appellant therefore is entitled to a jury trial on the question whether Appellant 
suffered a taking from UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15. 
4 
IL UNIFORM
 Q P E R A T I Q N
 Q F L A W S C L A I M 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision in the Utah Constitution provides no private right of 
action because it is not self-executing, and (2) that even if such a private right of action is 
provided, damages are not available as a remedy for its violation. Appellee's Bi ic I, | >|> ll'» II6. 
• s * requires 
either a statutory or common law cause of action such as a negligence claim." hi. .\\ 1 ? [ he 
first two arguments lack merit and the third is a misinterpretation of the law. 
\ The Uniform Operation of Laws Clause Provides 
Because it is Self-executing 
Vv n^ i l t of action is available under the Uniform Operation of Laws clause 
in the _ tah Constitution because it is a self-executing provision "that can be judicially 
enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman v. Board of Education of the Box 
Elder County School District 
Clauses held self-executing). Utah Constitutional clauses are judicially 
enforceable if (a) they are mandatory and prohibitory, (b) they are judicially definable and 
enforceable without enabling legislation and (c) the framers intended them to lake el I eel 
First, the Uniform Laws Clause provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." UTAH CONST, ART. I, §24. *" TT 1 constitutional clauses are 
"mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they ai e declared u ,x oilu r \\ i. 
• - * ' • • e „ - • . . : 
5 
meets the first requirement for a self-executing provision. 
Second, as with the Due Process and Open Education Clauses at issue in Spackman, 
although the Uniform Laws Clause is expressed in general terms, it has been carefully 
defined and enforced by Utah courts many times, without implementing legislation. See, e.g., 
Pinetree Associates v. Ephraim City. 2003 UT 6, % 17,67 P.3d 462 (assessment of thirty water 
charges on condominium project while other users with only one meter were assessed only 
one monthly charge violated Uniform Operation of Laws); Lee v. Gaufim 867 P.2d 572, 577 
(Utah 1993)("For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not enough that 
it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform."); Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,669 (1984)(M[P]ersons similarly situated should be treated similarly, 
and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were 
the same."). The Uniform Laws Clause therefore is judicially enforceable without legislation. 
Third, the historical context in which the framers adopted the Uniform Laws Clause 
clearly shows that they intended to constitutionalize existing concepts that did not require 
implementing legislation to become effective. Particularly significant is that the Uniform 
Laws Clause embodies the same principles as the then-existing Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, 
§l(Equal Protection Clause); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 669 (Uniform Laws and Equal 
Protection "embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same."); see also Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 
6 
355- 56 (t Jtah 199 ] ) (troth clauses "embody the same general principles"); Mountain Fuel 
Suppl) ^ u ^ . ^ K . . ^ . i j u . , or^, 752 P 2 i 884: 888 ( [ Jl , tl I 1988) (s w im< ); I iedtke v. 
Schettler. 649 P.2d 80, 81 n. 1 (Utah 1982)(Uniform Laws Clause is "generally considered 
the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, IJ.S. Constitution") 
In fact, the founders reiterated in Article I, Section 2, that the people ,>i Utah are guaranteed 
tl le "eqi ml protection" : f theii state go\ ei in i i.e i it I I I A HCoi JS I ai I: I § 2. • " 
The Uniform Laws Clause therefore is self-executing and hence creates a private right 
of action for its enforcement. 
B . Damages a r e Available as a R e m e d y for Violation of the Uniform L a w s Clause 
Ilie Spacknian division emphasized tlul Ihe nx .lilnhililv ml diinuii'es ns a rnnoJv linn 
a constitutional violation is analytically distinct from whether a constitutional provision is 
self-executing. Spackman v. Board of Education of the Box Elder County School District, 
2000 1 1 1 8 7, i it "11 ' 1 " I he i • : •< i n I held 1 hat ; since C Jl i ill Cc >de Seel ion 68-3 1 adopts 1 he 
common law individuals could obtain damages for violations of their rights enumerated in 
fundamental documents which were the forerunners of our state and federal constitutions, 
iumages - u 
constitutional provision rests on the common law." Id. at f20. 
The Spackman decision went on to describe the three elements required for Appellant 
to obtain damages for UDOT's violation of Appellant's right to Uniform Laws, each of which 
\ ppellant cai I estat >lisl I: I "lii st, , Appellant's complaint must sufficiently allege a "flagrant" 
7 
violation of its constitutional rights. Spackman, at ^ [23. Appellant alleged it was not provided 
with accommodations to alleviate the impact of the 1-15 reconstruction which were provided 
to other similarly situated businesses. (R. 6, Opening Brief, Addendum Exhibit 3, f26). 
Appellant further alleged that "... UDOT ... discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, by among other things, arbitrarily and 
capriciously providing [those other similarly situated] businesses" with accommodations not 
provided to Appellant—including diversion of traffic to provide such businesses with 
continued access to the 45th South offramp—and that such discriminatory treatment was 
"unreasonable and ... not for a legitimate legislative purpose." (R. 10, Opening Brief, 
Addendum Exhibit 3, 1fl[39, 40). Such allegations sufficiently state a claim for a flagrant 
denial of the right to uniform operation of laws. 
Second, Appellant must have no existing remedies to redress its injuries. Spackman, 
at [^24. UDOT has not identified any remedy otherwise available to Appellant. On the 
contrary, UDOT has strenuously contended throughout this litigation that Appellant has no 
remedy whatsoever. 
Third, equitable relief, such as an injunction, must be wholly inadequate to protect 
Appellants rights or to redress its injuries. Spackman, at^f25. Appellant does not contend that 
1-15 should not have been rebuilt, but only that UDOT should not have treated Appellant 
discriminatorily, in violation of Appellant's right to Uniform Laws. Accordingly, equitable 
relief, such as an injunction, was wholly inadequate both at the time of the 1-15 
reconstruction and today. 
8 
Damages therefore are available as a remedy for violation of the Uniform Laws 
entitled to damages "depends on the application of the analysis ... to the particular 
circumstances of the case." Spackman, at ^ 27. That determination is for the juiy on remand. 
C. A Claim for Violation of the Uniform Laws Clause Does Not Require a Statutory 
or Common Law Cause of Action 
I JDOT contends tl lat Spademan stai ids for the pi opositionthat' '[a] claim foi * - iolation 
of a state constitutional right requires either a statutory or common law cause of action such 
as a negligence claim.'1 Appellee's Brief, \ 1 c TTDOT go* on U> atmic (hat \ppellant "is 
unable to point to an express creation of a private cause of action 
UDOT's reading of Spackman woi lid n lake the ca- " '- • ' • • il 
issue in the case was whether the Uniform Laws Clause itself provided a pn\ ak, right uf 
action. The court held that it did. Nowhere in the opinion does the court suggest that a 
separate, independent source of r ight ' is necessary, 
X JDOT goes astray, it apjvan;, in Ms mlnpidat slatcm- />path. nan that 
"a \ Jtah court's ability to award damages for violation oi a self-executing constitutional 
provision rests on the common law." Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-16, quoting Spackman, at f 20. 
courts in Utah have power as institutions to award damages for state constitutional \ iolations 
that are held to be self-executing. The source of that power is the common law of England. 
Once having made that determination, the court went on to define the elements a trial court 
"M I jinagc .-. -lai., n in any particular case. 
o 
Spackman, at f 22. At no time did the court say that a claimant needed anything more. 
In summary, the Spackman case establishes that the right to be free from 
discriminatory treatment is embodied in the Uniform Laws Clause. Discriminatory treatment 
in violation of the Clause by itself gives rise to Appellant's right to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the final judgment by the trial court and remand the case 
for further proceedings. UDOT should be taxed with costs on appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 2004. 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed eight copies of the foregoing, one containing an original signature, as well 
as a CD containing an electronic version of the same in WordPerfect format, with the Clerk 
of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84114-0230 
and served two copies of the foregoing upon the following: 
Attorney for Defendant Utah Department of Transportation 
Randy S. Hunter 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this 21st day of June, 2004, addressed as set forth 
above. 
^ ^ _ _ _ | ..HI • • • ! ™=*=*r 
